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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN COAL CO., 
EMERY MINING CORP. , 
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiff/appellant, Case No. 19134 
vs. 
TERRY W. SANDSTROM, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant/respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs seek review of an Order of the Inctustrial 
Commission of Utah awarding Worker's Compensation benefits to Mr. 
Terry W. Sandstrom, but refusing plaintiff's request for reimbursement 
from the Second Injury Fund of the Industrial CoJTUnission. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
An initial hearing was held before Administrative Law 
i,,c]qp Richard G. Sumsion at 1:00 p.m. on the 11th day of January, 
1 1 Al that time the parties, Terry Sandstrom, The State Insurance 
,,.,1, 1ncl the Second Injury Fune', entered into a stipulated compensation 
stipulating to a 20 96 oermanent partial disability, 
10\ from a pre-existing condition and 10% from an accident incurred 
-1-
While Sandstrom was in the employ of the nlaintif f in this case. 
On January 21, 1983, the Administrative Law ,Judqe, Richi'!rd r,_ ,c,cr 
entered his Findings of Fact, Cone 1 us inns nf La1v an,·] Order in tl,c 
On January 31, 1983, plaintiffs herein filed a Motion for Review 
challenging the Administrative Law ,Judge's failure to award contc;. 
to the State Insurance Fund from the Second In-jury Funn for medici' 
expenses and temporary total compensation paid. On March lR, 198;, 
the Industrial Commission denied plaintiff's Motion for Review. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs are requesting that the portion of the Order 
the Industrial Commission denying plaintiffs recovery from the Sec-:· 
Injury Fund for 50% of the temporary total disability 
and 50% of the medical expenses paid during total temporary 
be vacated and the case remanded to the Inclustrial Commission. .\ ., 
Order of the Commission should be entered qranting olaintiff 
bursement from the Second Injury Fund of 50% of total temporary 
disability compensation paid and 50% of the medical expenses that 
the State Insurance Fund has paid to the applicant herein. 
FACTS 
Mr. Terry W. Sandstrom, the applicant herein, sustained 
personal injury in four separate accidents arising out of or in t'.e 
course of his employment. The dates of these accidents are as 
follows: November 21, lg77, May 4, 1979, December 17, 1980, and 
November 23, 1981. (R. at 39) 
At the time of the January 21, 1977 ciccident and t-he 
19 79 accident, Sandstrom was employed by American Coal f'Ol'lP•W' 
1980, applicant was employed by Emery r1ininq Corooration and in 
November of 1981 he was employed by Gusco, Inc., (r. cit )O) · 
-2-
As a result of these accidents, applicant has suffered 
' total overall impairment of 20% permanent partial disability of 
•he whole man to his back and 10% permanent partial disability of 
th< whole man to his neck. (R. at 39). The injury to plaintiff's 
back is the subject matter of this appeal. The State Insurance Fund 
and the Second Injury Fund have stipulated that 10% of permanent 
partial disability to the back results from the 1981 accident and 
10% is attributable to the 1977 accident. (R. at 39, 43). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Is the State Insurance Fund entitled to reimbursement 
for 50% of the temporary total disability compensation and medical 
expenses which it has paid the applicant as a result of the November 
23, 1981, injury to his lower back? 
ARGUMENT 
IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF ENCOURAGING 
EMPLOYERS TO HIRE HANDICAPPED PERSONS, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 35-1-69, 
MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MANDATING THAT THE SECOND INJURY FUND 
REIMBURSE THE EMPLOYER OR ITS INSURANCE CARRIER FOR A SHARE OF 
MEDICAL EXPENSES AND TOTAL TEMPORARY DISABILITY COMPENSATION EQUAL 
TO THE PERCENTAGE OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
ANY PRE-EXISTING MEDICAL CONDITION. 
This Court's pre-1981 interpretation of Section 35-1-69, 
allowing contribution from the Second Injury Fund for all types of 
Worker's Compensation claims, is still applicable since the relevant 
language of that statute remains basically the same. McPhie v. United 
States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504 (Utah 1976); Intermountain Health 
'arc Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977); White v. Industrial 
604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979); Intermountain Smelting Corp. 
__ 'c\Jpi tano, 610 P. 2d 334 (Utah 1980). 
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Furthermore, this Court's interpretation of Section )'i-1-69, 
subsequent to the 1981 amendments thereof, demonstrates that 
Court's interpretation has not changed. Paoli v. Cottonwoorl 
Hospital, 656 P.2d 410 (Utah 1982); Unites States Fidelity & r, 11 iir. 
Co. v. Industrial Commission of 647 P.2rl 754 (Utah 1983). 
In Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d r: 
(Utah 1977), this court held that 35-1-69 required proportionate 
contribution from the special fund (now the Second Iniury Fund) 
compensation and medical benefits in cases involving pre-existinq 
injuries. In Intermountain Health Care, the Commission found that 
claimant had a permanent partial disability of 30%, 10% attributat. 
to her pre-existing psychological condition and 20% attributable '· 
accident which occured while on the job. The Commission failed, 
however, to require the Special Fund to pay its proportionate share 
of medical expenses. This Court found that 35-1-69 required the 
Commission to pay one -third of the medical expenses and compensat.:· 
because one-third of the employee's permanent partial disability,. .. ' 
attributable to her pre-existing condition. In the instant case, 
parties stipulated that 50% of Sandstrom' s disability is due to a 
pre-existing injury. Therefore, under the holding of Intermounta1r 
Health Care, the Second Injury Fund should reimburse the State !rs.:· 
Fund for 50% of the medical expenses and temporary total Cl.isabi'.tr 
compensation that it has paid to Sandstrom. This Court extended 
holding in Intermountain Health Care, to cover temporary total 
disability compensation, in the case of White v. Industrial Col'U",'_:. 
of Utah, 604 P.2d 478 (Utah 1979). In 1-Vhi te, the court consul iJJ' 
several cases, each of which depended upon judicial constructi'"' 
§ 35-1-69. In each case this Court held that "he Seccond Tn1uc· r: 
-4-
must reimburse the insurance carrier for the proportion of medical 
''xpenses and temporary total disability compensation equal to the 
'"- rcen tage of permanent partial disability applicable to the pre-
<°X l sting injury. Though § 35-1-69 has since been amended, the 
language upon which this court relied in both White and 
Intermountain Health Care remains basically the same. That language, 
as quoted in White, follows: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accident or injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an 
industrial injury for which compensation and 
medical care is provided by this title that 
results in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have 
incurred if he had not had the pre-existing 
incapacity, compensation and medical care, 
which medical care and other related items are 
outlined in § 35-1-81, shall be awarded on 
the basis of the combined injuries, but the 
liability of the employer for such compensation 
and medical care shall be for the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be paid out 
of the special fund provided for in §35-1-68 (1) 
hereinafter referred to as the "special fund". 
Id. at 479. 
That language, even after the amendments, remains 
basically the same: 
35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent 
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training 
of employee. (1) If any employee who has previously 
incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, 
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial 
injury for which either compensation o!'ld or medical 
care, or both is provided by this title that results 
in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater 
than he would have incurred if he had not had the 
pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is 
agravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation 
o!'ld medical care, wh±eh med±ea± eore and other related 
items ore as outlined in Section 35-1-81, shall be 
awarded basis of the combined injuries, but the 
liability of the employer for such compensation o!'ld 
medical care, and other related items shall be for the 
industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out 
of the second injury fund provided for in 
Section 35-1-68 (1) here±!'lafter referred to the 
fti!'ld". 
!_·1 -.!h C•JdC' i\nn. §35-1-69 (SU\)!J. 1981). 
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Both versions of the statute provide that t!iP •'MPloypr shall he 
responsible for the industrial injury only and that the remaind• 
shall be paid out of the Second Injury Fund. Tn the instant c2 , 
requiring the State Insurance Fund to pay 100% of the temporary 
total disability compensation and the medical expenses incurred 
is requiring the State Insurance Fund to incur liability for 
than just the industrial injury. 
Essentially, the State Insurance Fund is beina require'. 
to pay for the medical expenses and total temporary disability 
compensation attributable to the employee's pre-existinq 
as well as those attributable to the industrial injury. Such a 
requirement clearly discourages the hiring of handicapped 
since medical expenses for such persons are likely to be larger 
and the period of temporary total disability longer than for 
... 
injured employees not suffering from pre-existing Medical conditu· 
Discouraging employers from hiring handicapped workers defeats 
legislative purpose of § 35-1-69. 
In Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 
334 (Utah 1980), this Court again held that the Commission erred 
in ordering the employer to pay all medical comoensation and 
temporary total disability benefits when a portion of the disabil 
was attributable to a pre-existing injury. Again, the language o: 
§ 35-1-69 upon which the Court relies remains basically the sam. 
Discussing the language, the Court stated: 
We think that the reasonable conclusion to be drawn 
therefrom is that the employer is resrons1ble 
for only the percentage of compensation and 
medical care which the injury occurring in the 
employment bears to the appli;ant's total 
disabilitv. This conclusion is also born out 
by the final provision that anv amount which has 
been paid by the employer in excess of the portion 
-r,-
attributable to said industrial injury shall be 
reimbursed to him out of the special fund. 
(Emphasis added) 
rd. ot 337. 
In 1981 the Legislature added two paragraphs to § 35-1-69. 
The Second Injury Fund, apparently, relies on the second paragraph 
to argue that the Second Injury Fund is not liable for its 
oroportionate share of temporary total disability compensation 
3nd medical expenses paid out. That paragraph is as follows: 
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, 
medical expenses, or other related items are required 
as a result of the industrial injury subject to this 
section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall 
be responsible for all such temporary benefits, 
medical care, or other related items up to the end of 
the period of temporary total disability resulting 
from the industrial injury. Any allocation of disability, 
benefits, medical care, or other related items following 
such a period shall be made between the employer or 
its insurer and the second injury fund as provided for 
herein, and any payments made by the employer and its 
insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share 
shall be recoverable.at the time of the award for 
combined disabilities if any is made hereunder. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (Supp. 1981). 
The only logical reading of that paragraph, the only reading which 
preserves the legislative purpose of 35-1-69, is that the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay benefits and expenses 
during the period of temporary total disability compensation and 
then shall be reimbursed from the Second Injury Fund after the 
stabilization date when determination of the percentage of permanent 
partial disability attributable to each accident can be made. The 
in that paragraph, ". the employer or it's insurance 
:1rr1er shall be responsible . ", requires that interpretation. 
r1,,_. Leqislature has purposely used the word "responsible" and not 
t lie word "liable", which indicates that the purpose of adding this 
pardqraph was to clarify the administrative orocess by which the 
-7-
employee would be paid. This para<Jr3ph simplifies thilt rrc>c"'?rlur• 
by mandating that the employer or insurilnce compilny pay ,,11 hcnPf,, 
to the employee anct that allocations he marle afterwords in orrlPr 
avoid a denial of liability by the emrloyer to force thr• .ill'lrat" 
issue before the Commission. Furthermnre, the statute cleurl 1,1 
that any allocations shall be made arter the Period of temporary .,. 
disability and that any payment "made by the emoloyer or the insup" 
carrier in excess of its proportionate shares shall be recoverablE. 
The statute states: "Any allocation of disability benefits, medica: 
or other related items following such period shall be made between 
employer or his insurer and the second iniury fund as Provided for 
herein, That statement provides thilt the allocation shal' 
be made following the period of total temporary disability. Aooar"" 
the Second Injury Fund, has misinterpreted that statement to reac' ": 
the allocation wi 11 be made of benefits an ct medical care fol . / 
period of temporary total disability compensation. Further, that 
sentence provides that allocation shall be made between the emol0 
and the Second Injury Fund as "provided for herein". The statute 
provides that allocation shall be made according to the oroportior.L 
share of disability attributable to the inctustrial iniury and 
attributable to the pre-existing conrlition. In this case, that a:·:· I 
would be 50% of the temporary total compensation anrl medical exoenscc 
to be paid by the State Insurance Fund, and 50% to be paid by th• 
Second Injury Fund. the Insurance Funrl is ent1• 
to a reimbursement of 50% of the temporary total c1isability cornpc• .... 
and the medical expenses it has paid to the employee in this c••• 
In Intermountain Smelting Corp, this court re•.•ersed the Comrn1ss 1 
order apportioning all medical expenses and temoorarv •otal 1 
-s-
LO the insurance carrier: . the refusal to require contribution 
from the special fund for temporary total disability and medical and 
hospilal expenses, as discussed in this opinion, is reversed." Id. 
A recent decision by this Court, indicates that the 
of § 35-1-69, even after the 1981 ammendments, still 
re•ruires reimbursement by the Second Injury Fund for temporary total 
disability compensation and medical expenses. In United Stated Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 
1983), this court interpretated § 35-1-69 as amended. Though that 
case involved several statutes and a fairly complicated fact situation, 
this court did discuss the implication and purpose of § 35-1-69: 
Explicit statutory authority exists to apportion 
compensation awards and medical costs between 
employers and the Second Injury Fund, provided 
pertinent conditions are met. Basically, those 
conditions are three in number: 1) Permanent 
incapacity occassioned by accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes, followed by 2) 
subsequent injury resulting in further permanent 
incapacity which is 3) substantially greater than 
that which would have been incurred if there had been 
no pre-existing incapacity. Those conditions 
having been met, the liability of the employer is 
assessed "on the basis of the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury only and the remainder shall be payable out 
of the said special (second injury) fund." 
(Emphasis added) 
Id. at 767. 
In the instant case, as in United States Fidelity, all three 
conditions have been met to allow apportioninq of compensation 
awards and medical costs between the State Insurance Fund and the 
Second Injury Fund. Moreover, nowhere in the Court's discussion 
ct 35-1-69 has the word compensation been modified, in such a way, 
,,, suggest that total temporary disability compensation is not 
t0 be apportioned between the employer or the insurance carrier 
and the Second Injury Fund. Furthermore, it is clear from the Court's 
-9---
discussion of this statute thcit meclicci l expenc·;Ps ar<> tn rw clpr"lr' 
between the employer and its insurancP carrier an<l Seconcl In 
Fund. 
Id. 
Finally, the Court, 3qain, discussc'cl Lht' p1lrf'()'.)t' \)f § 
Furthermore, of .J.n l:>mployer trJ r'.?tain 
an injured or disabled employee aftl•r an iniury without 
the risk of further liability for payment of compensatirr 
and medical expenses should ci subsequent injury occur, 
seems wholly consistent with the recognized statutorv 
purpose which is to encourage employers to hire disabled 
persons. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's refusal to orcler the Seconc 
Injury Fund to reimburse the State Insurance Fund for it's pro-
portionate share of medical expenses ancl temporary total comnensat1· 
rests on a faulty interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (Supc. 
1981) which tends to defeat the Legislative purpose of encouraqinn 
employers to hire handicapped workers. Therefore, plaintiffs 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate that portion of the 
Order of the Industrial Commission denving olaintiff's recovery 
from the Second Injury Fund for 50% of the temporary total disab1: 
compensation and 50% of the medical exoenses paicl Mr. Scindstrom due: 
the period of total temporary disability. 
DATED THIS of July, 1983. 
BLACK & MOORE 
- ) (I -
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